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Abstract
When firms can identify their past customers, they may use information about
purchase histories in order to price discriminate. We present a model with a mo-
nopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, where consumers can opt
out from being identified, possibly at a cost. We find that when consumers can co-
stlessly opt out, they all individually choose privacy, which results in the highest
profit for the monopolist. In fact, all consumers are better off when opting out is
costly. When valuations are uniformly distributed, social surplus is non-monotonic
in the cost of opting out and is highest when opting out is prohibitively costly. We
introduce the notion of a privacy gatekeeper — a third party that is able to act as a
privacy conduit and set the cost of opting out. We prove that the privacy gatekeeper
only charges the firm in equilibrium, making privacy costless to consumers.
Keywords: Privacy, price discrimination, anonymity, opt out, e-commerce
JEL Classifications: D02, L12, L50
1 Introduction
In recent years, revolutionary developments in information technology regarding col-
lection, storage, and retrieval of personal data (Acquisti & Varian, 2005) have brought
privacy to the forefront of public awareness and debate.1 This paper addresses a key
component of the emergent concerns regarding electronic privacy, namely the ability
of firms to track individual purchasing patterns and to use this information to practice
behavior-based price discrimination (Armstrong, 2006; Fudenberg & Villas-Boas, 2006).
∗We thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo, and Huseyin Yildirim for helpful
comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the NET Institute (www.netinst.org) and the
Kauffman Foundation.
1See for example pcworld.about.com/news/Jan262001id39447.htm.
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The US Census Bureau estimates that $135 billion in online retail sales were con-
ducted in the United States in 2007, and that online retail sales as percentage of total
retail sales have steadily increased over the past decade at an average rate of %3 per
quarter. Over the last 3 years, online retail sales have increased at an average annual
rate of %16. The Census also estimates that the total amount of currency transacted
in the online US consumer market in 2006 (including both retail and selected services)
exceeded $220 billion (US Census E-Stats, 2008). Records containing the sequence of
web sites visited and the online purchases made by individuals provide valuable clues
about their personal information, clues that can be used to target tailor-made offers to
them (Chen & Zhang, 2008; Wathieu, 2006; Pancras & Sudhir, 2007; Chen, 2006). Such
behavior-based advertising and price discrimination are already ubiquitous in electronic
commerce (Odlyzko, 2003; Hann et al. , 2007). Nevertheless, the economic impact of
these practices on individual consumers and on society overall has received little for-
mal study to date. The paucity of rigorous analysis has left policy makers with scant
guidance about the appropriate scope or the efficacy of the regulatory instruments at
their disposal. Presently, privacy practices in electronic commerce are dictated largely
by voluntary compliance with industry standards and recommendations by regulatory
agencies.
Although technology has allowed sellers to store and process consumers’ online ac-
tivities with relative ease, consumers still have a choice when it comes to sellers tracking
their individual consumer activities. For instance, consumers can exert effort to under-
stand sellers’ privacy disclosures and take actions to circumvent being identified by sell-
ers. Such actions can include erasing or blocking browser cookies, making payments
using a gift card acquired for cash in a brick-and-mortar store, and using a privacy
gatekeeper. A privacy gatekeeper is a third party to a transaction that works in the
following way: consumers store their sensitive information in the gatekeeper’s system,
and the gatekeeper in turn allows consumers to make online purchases with enhanced
privacy. For example, CitiBank allows their clients to instantly generate one-time-use
virtual credit-card numbers, which upon use are charged to a client’s actual card. Sim-
ilarly, Google Checkout gives consumers the option of not sharing their actual email
addresses with sellers by using a virtual email address to forward communication. In
extreme cases, consumers can also rent a personal postal box to maintain the privacy of
their physical address.
In its 2007 guidelines for online privacy (FTC, 2007), the US Federal Trade Com-
mission proposed several guiding principals to govern sellers’ online privacy practices:
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transparency and consumer control, reasonable security and limited data retention, and
consumer consent for changes in policy. In this paper, we focus on the principles of
transparency and consumer control. One way to interpret consumer control is that con-
sumers have the ability to opt out from having their information collected, and thus
to maintain their privacy.2 (We note that opting out may still involve using measures
such as blocking browser cookies in order to circumvent identification.) The principle
of transparency pertains to privacy related disclosures provided by sellers. Increased
transparency in disclosures translates to making it easier for consumers to safeguard
their information. Essentially, the main implication of the combination of these two
principles is that it should not be costly for consumers to maintain their privacy, should
they choose to do so.
These currently available set of guiding standards and recommendations, while ap-
parently quite sensible, have little or no basis in formal economic theory or empirical
tests. This paper proposes to provide rigorous economic analysis on the impact of pri-
vacy regulation with regard to consumer profiling and behavior-based price discrimina-
tion. In particular, we consider a monopolist who is able to track consumers’ purchase
histories. Consumers, however, are able to circumvent being identified as past customers
by taking (potentially costly) actions to preserve their anonymity. The cost of these ac-
tions can arise from multiple sources, such as exerting effort to understand disclosures,
erasing cookies, using virtual credit cards, or masking IP addresses. Interestingly, when
consumers can costlessly avoid detection, they all individually choose privacy, which
paradoxically results in the highest profit for the monopolist and a lower consumer sur-
plus. In fact, all consumers are better off when opting out is prohibitively costly. When
consumers’ valuations are uniformly distributed, costless privacy results in the lowest
consumer surplus. The situation that arises is a form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma: individ-
ually, consumers are best-responding by opting out. Collectively, however, they are all
worse off. The cost of opting out, when positive, essentially acts as a mitigating factor
that reduces this coordination problem among consumers. In fact, consumers are better
off overall when opting out is prohibitively costly.
The intuition is as follows. When the cost of opting out is high, consumers hesitate to
purchase in the first period, knowing they will pay a premium for doing so in the second
period. Anticipating this behavior by consumers, the firm reduces the price it charges
in the first period. Additionally, by being able to more effectively price discriminate, the
2Consumers may also have the ability to opt in to have their information collected, which is especially
relevant when there is some benefit to being identified — a setting we do not consider in this paper.
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firm can tailor a price to low valuation consumers in the second period — consumers
who would otherwise not purchase. Hence, consumers benefit from a high cost of opting
out.
We consider a more general framework in which a privacy gatekeeper sets this cost
and collects it as a fee. The privacy gatekeeper can also receive offers from the firm for
setting the fee at a certain level. We show that the privacy gatekeeper would only charge
the firm in equilibrium, making it costless for consumers to opt out. Consequently, the
existence of a privacy gatekeeper may hurt consumers. The surprising conclusion is that
hard-to-understand disclosures and difficult-to-circumvent identification may actually
work to the benefit of consumers and, in some cases, to the benefit of society overall.
Related Literature Work on intertemporal price discrimination and the “ratchet” ef-
fect (where consumers who signaled higher willingness to pay receive higher price offers)
originates back to the late 1970’s. Stokey (1979) and Salant (1989) show that intertem-
poral price discrimination is never optimal for a monopolist who can commit to future
prices. Freixas et al. (1985), Weitzman (1980), and Hart & Tirole (1988) study the monop-
olist’s problem in a repeated game under incomplete information and no commitment.
A relatively small economics literature on customer recognition and online privacy
has begun to develop over the past several years. Early contributions by Chen (1997),
Fudenberg & Tirole (1998), Fudenberg & Tirole (2000), Villas-Boas (1999, 2004), Shaffer
& Zhang (2000), Taylor (2003), and Chen & Zhang (2008) introduced the notion of cus-
tomer recognition and personalized pricing into economic theory, but did not explicitly
consider privacy issues in online environments. Fudenberg & Tirole (1998) explore what
happens when the ability to identify particular consumers may vary across goods. They
consider a model of goods upgrades and buy-backs where customers may be anonymous
or “semi-anonymous.” Fudenberg & Tirole (2000) analyze a duopoly in which some con-
sumers remain loyal and others defect to the competitor, a phenomenon they refer to as
“customer poaching.” Villas-Boas (1999) shows that two firms in a duopoly can compete
by lowering prices to attract the competitor’s previous customers. Villas-Boas (2004)
shows that targeted pricing by a monopolist who cannot commit to future prices may
make it worse off. Chen & Zhang (2008) analyze a “price for information” strategy, with
firms pricing less aggressively in order to learn more about their customers.
Optimal online privacy policies were first studied by Taylor (2004), Acquisti & Varian
(2005), Hermalin & Katz (2006), and Calzolari & Pavan (2006). Fudenberg & Villas-Boas
(2006) offer a survey of this literature.3 Taylor (2004) studies the market for customer
3For a general discussion of price discrimination see Stole (2007). For a review of the consumer switch-
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information and finds that the welfare implications of various regimes depend on the
sophistication of consumers. He finds that when consumers are myopic, an “open pri-
vacy” regime (where sale of customer information is permitted) works to the benefit of
firms. When customers are sophisticated, firms benefit from keeping their customers’
information private. His analysis, however, does not focus on the possibility that the
‘anonymity’ regime can be made endogenous through the consumer’s decision process.
Calzolari & Pavan (2006) study contracting environments with two principals (an up-
stream principal and a downstream principal) that interact sequentially with one com-
mon agent (the consumer). Fudenberg & Villas-Boas (2006) show that when the upstream
principal expropriates all the rent from the downstream principal, their results coincide
with Taylor (2004). However, Taylor (2004) offers a more general environment in that
consumers’ valuations need not be constant over time. Acquisti & Varian (2005) explore
the possibility of consumers using anonymizing technologies to maintain their privacy.
However, they consider a model with discrete consumer types, and only allow for either
costless or prohibitively costly anonymizing technologies. In contrast, we allow for con-
tinuous consumer types and an arbitrary cost (which we subsequently endogenize) of
using anonymizing technologies.
While the above papers provide important insights regarding the basic tensions with
respect to consumer privacy and price discrimination, they consider only a small set of
policy options available to firms and consumers. This paper proposes to build on the
growing privacy literature by exploring a richer environment in which individuals who
purchase goods online may (at some cost) choose to remain anonymous; i.e., choose to
opt out of a firm’s customer database. Our findings suggest that granting consumers
this option may have important consequences for pricing and welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 introduces and solves the benchmarks of no-recognition and full-recognition.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium with costly privacy. Section 5 fully analyzes the
model when valuations are distributed uniformly. Section 6 introduces the notion of a
privacy gatekeeper and endogenizes the cost of opting out. Section 7 concludes.
ing cost literature see Klemperer (1995). For an economic analysis of privacy with respect to lawful search
and seizure, see Mialon & Mialon (2008).
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2 The Model
2.1 The Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers with total mass normalized to one. All consumers
are risk-neutral, possess discount factor δ ∈ [0,1], and maximize their present expected
utilities. Each consumer demands at most one unit of a non-durable good in each of
two periods. Consumer i’s valuation for the good is the same in each period and is
determined by the realization of a random variable vi with support normalized to be
the unit interval. Consumer valuations are independently and identically distributed
according to the distribution function F(v) with density f(v), which is strictly positive
on [0,1]. Consumer i’s valuation vi is initially private information; i.e., known only to
him.
2.2 The Firm
There is a monopolist that produces and sells the good in each period. The firm has
production cost normalized to zero, possesses discount factor δ, and maximizes its dis-
counted expected profit. It does not observe consumer valuations directly but maintains
a database containing purchasing histories. In particular, each consumer is either anony-
mous or identifiable. If a consumer is anonymous, then there is no record of his prior
purchases; i.e., he is not in the database. If he is identifiable, then the firm knows his
purchasing decision in the first period.
The firm wants to maximize the expected discounted value of its profits. Given that
there is a continuum of consumers, each of them realizes that his decision does not
affect the prices charged by the firm in the next period.
2.3 The Game
At the beginning of the game all consumers are anonymous. Hence, the firm offers the
same price p1 to all of them. Next, each consumer decides whether to buy the good,
qi1 = 1, or not to buy it, qi1 = 0. Consumers who elect to buy the good also decide
whether to let the firm keep a record of the transaction (r i1 = 1) or to opt out and maintain
anonymity by deleting the record of the sale (r i1 = 0). The cost to any consumer who
opts out is c ≥ 0. This cost represents the time and effort of maintaining anonymity as
well as any monetary expense. A consumer who does not purchase the good continues
to be anonymous.
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At the beginning of period two, the firm posts a price p02 to the anonymous consumers
and a price p12 to the identifiable ones. Consumers may buy the good only at the price
offered to them; i.e., no arbitrage is possible. All aspects of the environment, including
the distribution of valuations F(v), are common knowledge. The solution concept is
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE).4
We assume throughout that v[1 − F(v)] is strictly quasi-concave in v (which is the
condition necessary for the existence of a unique local maximum in the static monopoly
case, and is implied by a monotone hazard rate and f(v) > 0 for v ∈ [0,1]). The
assumption on the support of the distribution is without loss of generality relative to
any compact interval.
3 Benchmarks
3.1 No Customer Recognition
Consider first as a benchmark the case of no customer recognition, in which the monop-
olist cannot price discriminate in the second period between the consumers that bought
and did not buy in the first period. The optimal price charged is the same in both pe-
riods and is given by p? = arg maxp{1 − F(p)}, generating a profit in each period of
p?(1− F(p?)). Consumer surplus in each period is given by ∫ 1p?(v − p?)dF(v).
Example 1 When valuations are uniformly distributed, p? = 0.5. Equilibrium present
discounted profit is given by 1+δ4 , present discounted consumer surplus is given by (1+
δ)(1− v˜)(1+v˜2 − p?) = 1+δ8 , and present discounted social surplus is 3(1+δ)8 .
3.2 Full Customer Recognition
Consider now the case in which the monopolist is able to recognize the previous cus-
tomers and consumers are unable to opt out, as in Hart & Tirole (1988), Schmidt (1993),
Villas-Boas (2004), and Taylor (2004). For example, an internet store may be able to
recognize returning customers through cookies installed on their computer, and charge
them different prices. In this setting, the monopolist can identify in the second period
two different groups of consumers: those who purchased in the first period, and those
4The majority of the results go through when there is a finite number of consumers, provided we add
the following assumption: the firm does not know (but has beliefs over) how many consumers opted out
when setting second period prices. For example, if consumers can opt out by erasing cookies or by using
a virtual credit card, then the firm does not know how many consumers actually used these techniques
when it sets prices. Having a continuum of consumers allows us to avoid this assumption.
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who did not purchase in the first period. In the second period, the monopolist can sub-
sequently charge two different prices, p12 and p
0
2 .
Proposition 1 (Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2006) In the full-recognition equilibrium, con-
sumers with valuations v ∈ [v˜,1] purchase in both periods and consumers with valua-
tions v ∈ [p02, v˜] purchase only in the second period. In the second period, the firm sets
p12 = v˜ . The cutoff type v˜ and prices p1 and p02 are determined by solving the follow-
ing three equations: v˜(p1) = (1 − δ)−1(p1 − p02(v˜)), v˜(p1) = F(p02) + f(p02)p02 , and the
first-order condition:
p1
(
1−F(v˜(p1))
)+δ(p12(v˜(p1))(1−F(p12(v˜(p1))))+p02(v˜(p1))(F(v˜(p1))−F(p02(v˜(p1)))))
Finally, v˜ ≥ p? holds in equilibrium.
Proof: A consumer of type v decides to buy in the first period if v − p1 + δmax{v −
p12,0} ≥ δmax{v−p02,0}. From this inequality one can then obtain directly that if a type
v˜ chooses to buy in the first period then all the types v > v˜ also choose to buy in the
first period. That is, the consumers that buy for the first time in the second period value
the product less than any of the consumers that buy in the first period.
In order to derive the type of the marginal consumer, we first consider the pricing
decision of the monopolist with respect to identified consumers in the second period.
Recall p? = arg maxp p[1 − F(p)] is the price that maximizes the profit in one period
when consumers do not have any reason to refrain from buying, that is, they buy if their
valuation v is greater than the price charged. p? is the monopoly price in a one-period
game, or the price in the no-recognition equilibrium.
Let v˜ denote the type of the marginal consumer in the first period. If v˜ > p?, the
monopolist sets p12 = v˜ . If, on the other hand v˜ < p?, the monopolist sets p12 = p?.
That is, p12 = max{v˜, p?}. The marginal consumer in the first period is then determined
by
v˜ − p1 = δmax{v˜ − p02,0}
which results in v˜ = p1 if p1 ≤ p02 , and v˜ = p1−δp
0
2
1−δ ≥ p1 if p1 > p02 .
The expression for v˜ shows an important aspect of the market dynamics: If prices
are expected to increase, each consumer does not have any reason to behave strategically
and buys if his valuation is above the current price. If, on the other hand, prices are ex-
pected to decrease, some consumers will behave strategically, choosing not to purchase
and be identified in the first period, in order to get a better deal in the second period.
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To see that prices cannot increase, assume otherwise. Then v˜ = p1. However, the mo-
nopolist then sets p02(v˜) = arg maxp p(F(p1)− F(p)), implying that p02 < p1. Therefore,
p02 ≤ p1. Thus, the marginal consumer in the first period, v˜(p1), is determined by
v˜(p1) = p1 − δp
0
2(v˜(p1))
1− δ
The optimal prices in the second period are p12(v˜) = max{p?, v˜} and F(v˜) = F(p02) +
f(p02)p
0
2 (obtained from p
0
2(v˜) = arg maxp p(F(v˜)− F(p))). Hence, the monopolist sets
the first period price, p1, to maximize
p1
(
1−F(v˜(p1))
)+δ(p12(v˜(p1))(1−F(p12(v˜(p1))))+p02(v˜(p1))(F(v˜(p1))−F(p02(v˜(p1)))))
(1)
where the first term represents profit from first-period sales and the second term rep-
resents second-period profit. Under the assumption that v˜ > p?, which is satisfied in
equilibrium, we have p12 = v˜ . Using the Envelope Theorem on the right-most part of (1),
the first-order condition that defines the optimal p?1 is given by
1− F(v˜)− p?1 f(v˜)v˜′ + δv˜′(1− F(v˜)− f(v˜)v˜ + f(v˜)p02(v˜)) = 0 (2)
Note that the marginal consumer buying the product in the first period has a higher
valuation than if there were no customer recognition, i.e. v˜ ≥ p?. To see this, note that
after substituting for 1− F(p?)−p?f(p?) = 0 and p?(1− δ) = p1 − δp02(p?), the first-
order condition (2) evaluated at v˜ = p? is equal to f(p?)p?(1 − (1 − δ)v˜′). Given that
v˜′ = ∂v˜∂p1 =
1
1−δ+δp0′2
and since p0
′
2 = ∂p
0
2
∂v˜ > 0 follows from F(v˜) = F(p02)+ f(p02)p02 and
quasiconcavity of p(1− F(p)), that derivative is positive. Hence, the monopolist should
increase p1, which, since v˜′ > 0, implies a higher valuation of the marginal consumer
than p?.
The monopolist’s pricing strategy towards identified consumers in the second period,
p12 , is of interest. In particular, if the cutoff type for identified consumers, v˜ satisfies
v˜ > p?, the monopolist sets p12 = v˜ . If, on the other hand v˜ < p?, the monopolist sets
p12 = p?. That is, p12 = max{v˜, p?}. Hence, the marginal consumer in the first period
gets no surplus in second period. This is the "ratchet effect" of consumers who reveal
their types (e.g. Freixas et al. (1985)).
In equilibrium, a consumer with valuation v˜ is just indifferent between purchasing
in both periods and only in the second period. Since p12 = v˜ , it follows that v˜ − p1 =
δ(v˜ − p02). One can then simplify the firm’s present discounted profit to obtain v˜(1 −
F(v˜)) + δp02(1 − F(p02)), which is strictly below the present value of profits under no
9
customer recognition, since p? uniquely maximizes p(1 − F(p)). The intuition is that
the marginal consumers refrain from purchasing in the first period because they know
that they can get a lower price in the next period. We note that the result of lower profits
under full-recognition does not hold if the monopolist’s discount factor is sufficiently
high relative to the discount factor of consumers.
Finally, we note that if the monopolist is able to commit to second-period prices, the
reduced expression for its present-discounted profit is given by
p12(1− F(p12))+ δp02(1− F(p02))
which is uniquely maximized when p12 = p02 = p?. Thus, the firm’s profit under com-
mitment coincides with the no-recognition equilibrium, and is higher than in the full-
recognition game.
Example 2 When valuations are uniformly distributed, one can obtain p02(v˜) = v˜/2,
v˜(p1) = 2p1/(2− δ), and p?1 = (4− δ2)/(8+ 2δ). Simple algebra shows that, as argued
above, the present value of profits is lower than in the no customer recognition case for
all δ. One can also get that 2/(4+ δ) consumers buy in both periods, while (2+ δ)/(8+
2δ) consumers only buy in the second period. As δ grows larger so that consumers
become more strategic, the number of consumers buying in both periods decreases, as
consumers wait for future deals. Subsequently, the number of consumers that only buy
in the second period increases.
4 Opting Out and Partial Recognition
We now consider the setting in which consumers who purchase in the first period can
opt out and preserve anonymity at a cost c (c could be the cost of understanding dis-
closures and taking actions to circumvent detection, such as using a virtual credit card).
Consumers who purchase in the first period and do not opt out are recognized by the
firm in the second period and will be offered the price p12 . All other consumers are of-
fered the price p02 in the second period. As above, let v˜ denote the lowest consumer type
that purchases in the first period. Denote by α(v) the (possibly degenerate) probability
that a type v ∈ [v˜,1] consumer deletes his sales record and remains anonymous in the
second period. Then the distribution of valuations among anonymous consumers is
F0(v) =

F(v)
F(v˜)+∫ 1v˜ α(x)f(x)dx if v ≤ v˜
F(v˜)+∫vv˜ α(x)f(x)dx
F(v˜)+∫ 1v˜ α(x)f(x)dx if v > v˜
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and the distribution of valuations among identifiable consumers (for v ≥ v˜) is given by
F1(v) =
∫ v
v˜ (1−α(x))f(x)dx∫ 1
v˜ (1−α(x))f(x)dx
4.1 Costless Privacy
Proposition 2 (Costless privacy) If c = 0, then the following strategies are part of a PBE:
p1 = p02 = p?, p12 ≥ p?, and v˜ = p?. Consumers with valuations v ∈ [p?,1] purchase in
both periods and opt out with probability α = 1.
Proof: If p1 = p?, since it is costless to opt out, every consumer with valuation v ≥ p?
would (weakly) prefer to purchase the good in the first period. If p02 = p? and p12 ≥
p?, all the consumers who purchased in the first period also purchase in the second
period, and other consumers do not. Furthermore, consumers are at most indifferent
about opting out and not opting out, hence all consumers opting out is a best response.
Consequently, it is a best response for the firm to set p02 = p?. Similarly, given that all
consumers with valuations v ≥ p1 purchase in the first period and opt out, the firm is
maximizing (1−F(p))p+δ(1−F(p?))p? in the first period. Hence, setting p1 = p? is a
best-response for the firm. Finally, any p12 ≥ p02 maintains opting out as a best response
for consumers (and any such p12 is a best response by the firm, since all consumers opt
out).
Corollary 1 later shows that under a sensible equilibrium refinement, when c = 0, the
equilibrium in which p1 = p02 = p12 = v˜ = p? is the unique equilibrium.
This result is alarming from the perspective of consumers. It says that if the cost of
preserving anonymity is nil, then it is in the interest of every individual who purchases
the good in the first period to delete his record. This, however, leads to an equilibrium
outcome that is identical to the profit-maximizing full-commitment sales mechanism.
Recall that the firm would like to commit not to use any information it learns about
consumer valuations from purchasing histories; i.e., it would like to charge a constant
price for the good. When consumers all opt out, they essentially grant the firm the
requisite power to commit to this mechanism because it cannot use information it does
not possess. Note, however, that if there were no option for preserving anonymity, then
the equilibrium derived in the Customer Recognition section would obtain.
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4.2 Costly Privacy
The Pooling PBE
In a pooling PBE, all consumers who purchase the good in the first period opt out with
the same probability α. Hence, second-period beliefs in such an equilibrium are given by
F0(v) =

F(v)
F(v˜)+α(1−F(v˜)) if v ≤ v˜
F(v˜)+α(F(v)−F(v˜))
F(v˜)+α(1−F(v˜)) if v > v˜
and
F1(v) = F(v)− F(v˜)
1− F(v˜)
In the second period, the firm chooses its prices to maximize profit according to
max
pr2
(1− Fr (pr2))pr2 for r = 0,1 (3)
Lemma 1 Let c > 0 and suppose α(v) = α for all v ∈ [v˜,1]. Then in every PBE, p02 ≤
p1 ≤ v˜ ≤ p12 .
Proof: It is straightforward to see that as in the previous section, p12 = max{p?, v˜}.
Hence, v˜ ≤ p12 . Assume on the contrary that p02 > p12 . Then no consumer opts out.
Hence, the only consumers for whom the firm has no record are those with valuations
v ∈ [0, v˜]. Therefore, p02 ≤ v˜ ≤ p12 , which is in contradiction to the premise. Thus,
p02 ≤ p12 .
Note that p1 ≤ v˜ must hold for the marginal consumer with valuation v˜ to be willing
to purchase in the first period. Thus, it remains to show that p02 ≤ p1. Assume on
the contrary that p02 > p1. Then no new consumer purchases in the second period,
and all consumers with valuations v ≥ p1 purchase in the first period. Hence, v˜ = p1.
If p1 < p?, the firm would set p12 = p?. If p1 > p?, the firm would set p12 = p1.
Since no new consumers purchase in the second period, it is optimal for the firm to set
p1 = p12 = p?. Subsequently, v˜ = p?. If p02 > p1 = v˜ , the firm has a strictly profitable
deviation by setting p02 = v˜ − , where  < c, because then consumers with valuations
v ∈ [v˜ − , v˜] would purchase in the second period, yet no repeat consumer would opt
out. Hence, p02 ≤ p1 must hold in equilibrium.
The following proposition characterizes the pooling equilibrium for sufficiently small
values of c. Proposition 4, which follows immediately, fully specifies the relevant range
on c.
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Proposition 3 (Pooling equilibrium) In a pooling equilibrium, consumers with valuations
v ∈ [v˜,1] purchase in both periods and opt out with probability α. Consumers with
valuations v ∈ [p02, v˜] purchase only in the second period. In the second period, the
firm sets p12 = max{v˜, p?}, and p02 is determined from F(p02(v˜)) + f(p02(v˜))p02(v˜) =
F(v˜)(1 − α) + α. For sufficiently small c, the cutoff type v˜ , the opting out probability α,
and the first period price p1 are determined by solving the following system of equations:
v˜ = p1 − δp
0
2(v˜)(1−α)+ δαc
1− δ(1−α)
1− F(v˜)− p?1 f(v˜)v˜′ + δv˜′(1−α)
(
1− F(v˜)− f(v˜)v˜ + f(v˜)p02(v˜)
) = 0
α = (v˜ − c)f(v˜ − c)+ F(v˜ − c)− F(v˜)
1− F(v˜)
In equilibrium, v˜ ≥ p?, p1 = v˜ − δc, p12 = v˜ , and p02 = v˜ − c.
Proof: It follows from Lemma 1 that the (relevant) solutions to the firm’s second period
problem are given by
p02(v˜) = arg maxp (1−
F(p)
F(v˜)+α(1− F(v˜)))p (4)
and
p12 =max{p?, v˜} (5)
To determine the marginal consumer type v˜ that purchases in the first period, equate the
expected utility from purchasing the good in the first period to the utility from waiting
to purchase until the second period. By Lemma 1, this amounts to
v˜ − p1 + δ
(
α(v˜ − p02 − c)+ (1−α)max{0, (v˜ − p12)}
) = δ(v˜ − p02)
Assuming v˜ ≥ p? so that p12 = v˜ (which we show below is satisfied in equilibrium), we
obtain
v˜ = p1 − δp
0
2(v˜)(1−α)+ δαc
1− δ(1−α) (6)
The firm’s first-period problem is to choose the marginal type v˜ and the prices p1, p02
and p12 to solve
max
p1
(1− F(v˜(p1)))p1 + δ
(
(1−α)(1− F(v˜(p1)))v˜(p1)+
+(F(v˜(p1))+α(1− F(v˜(p1)))− F(p02(v˜(p1))))p02(v˜(p1))
)
Using the Envelope Theorem on the right-most part, the first-order condition is given by
1− F(v˜)− p?1 f(v˜)v˜′ + δv˜′(1−α)
(
1− F(v˜)− f(v˜)v˜ + f(v˜)p02(v˜)
) = 0 (7)
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In order for mixing consumers to be indifferent between opting out and not opting out,
p02 + c = p12 must hold in equilibrium. From the equilibrium condition that p12 = v˜ =
p02 + c together with (9), we can obtain
α = (v˜ − c)f(v˜ − c)+ F(v˜ − c)− F(v˜)
1− F(v˜) (8)
Given a sufficiently small5 c, equalities (4)-(8) fully characterize the equilibrium. Given a
specific distribution F , they can be used to solve for p02 , p1, v˜ , and α.
We now show that v˜ ≥ p? is indeed satisfied in equilibrium. From (4), p02(v˜) is
implicitly defined by the following first-order condition:
F(p02(v˜))+ f(p02(v˜))p02(v˜) = F(v˜)(1−α)+α (9)
Since F(v˜)(1 − α) + α ≤ 1, it follows from (9) that p02 ≤ p? (recall p? satisfies F(p?) +
f(p?)p? = 1). Quasiconcavity of p(1 − F(p)) implies that 2f(p) + f ′(p)p ≥ 0 for
p ≤ p?. In addition, by implicit function theorem, ∂p02/∂v˜ = p0
′
2 = f(v˜)(1−α)2f(p02)+f ′(p02)p02 . Since
p02 ≤ p?, it follows that p0
′
2 ≥ 0.
Now, after substituting for 1 − F(p?) − p?f(p?) = 0 and p?(1 − δ(1 − α)) = p1 −
δ(1−α)p02(p?)− δαc, the first-order condition (7) evaluated at v˜ = p? reduces to
f(p?)
(
p? − v˜′(p?(1− δ(1−α))− δαc))
Using (6), we can substitute for p1, and given that v˜′ = 1
1−δ(1−α)+δ(1−α)p0′2
and p0
′
2 ≥ 0,
the above derivative reduces to f(p?)
(
p?(1− 1−δ(1−α)
1−δ(1−α)+δ(1−α)p0′2
)+ δαc
1−δ(1−α)+δ(1−α)p0′2
)
,
which is non-negative and strictly positive if δ > 0. Hence, the monopolist would increase
p1. Since v˜′ > 0, this entails v˜ ≥ p?. (We note that when c = 0 or δ = 0, v˜ = p?.)
When α ∈ (0,1), p02 + c = p12 must hold in equilibrium for consumers to be willing
to mix. Since p12 = v˜ , this further implies that p02 + c = v˜ . Subsequently, we have
v˜ − p1 = δ(v˜ − p02). In other words, after purchasing in the first period, the marginal
consumer anticipates zero payoff from the second period. Thus, the marginal consumer
is just indifferent between purchasing only in the first period and purchasing only in the
second period. Therefore, when α ∈ (0,1), p1 = v˜ − δc, p02 = v˜ − c, and p12 = v˜ .
It follows from Proposition 3 that when c is sufficiently small, p1 = v˜−δc, p02 = v˜−c,
and p12 = v˜ . Essentially, new customers receive an “introductory” offer in both periods.
The following proposition formally characterizes equilibrium as a function of c, and
provides the relevant range on c.
5The relevant range of c is formally described in Proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 (Scope of pooling equilibrium) There exists c¯ > 0 such that α(c) > 0 for
all c ∈ [0, c¯) and α(c) = 0 for all c ≥ c¯. When c ≥ c¯, the pooling equilibrium coincides
with the full-recognition equilibrium, and when c = 0, the pooling equilibrium coincides
with the no-recognition equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the firm’s pricing strategy in the second period of the full-recognition
game:
p0?2 = arg max
p02
(F(v˜)− F(p02))p02
and
p1?2 =max{v˜, p?}
Let c¯ denote the first c > 0 such that α(c¯) = 0. Such c¯ exists for the following rea-
son. Consider cˆ = p1,FR2 − p0,FR2 , where the latter are the second period prices from the
equilibrium of the full-recognition game. In the partial-privacy game, given c = cˆ, it is
equilibrium for α(cˆ) = 0, and for all other variables to coincide with the full-recognition
outcome. Hence, cˆ is a candidate for c¯, and indeed satisfies α(cˆ) = 0. To see that c¯ = cˆ,
suppose otherwise. Then there exists c < cˆ such that p12(c) − p02(c) = c and α(c) = 0.
However, that implies that there is another solution to the full-recognition game, which
is a contradiction. Thus, c¯ = cˆ = p1,FR2 − p0,FR2 .
Now, assume on the contrary that for some c > c¯, α increases (above 0). First, note
that since c > c¯, the full recognition equilibrium is feasible at c, and the firm can obtain
it by setting p1 = pFR1 . From p12 − p02 = c, we have p02 = v˜ − c. Taking a derivative with
respect to c, we obtain ∂p
0
2
∂c = ∂v˜∂c − 1. Additionally, from (9),
∂p02
∂c
= ∂p
0
2
∂v˜
∂v˜
∂c
+ ∂p
0
2
∂α
∂α
∂c
Combining the equalities and simplifying, we obtain
∂v˜
∂c
(p0
′
2 − 1)+
∂p02
∂α
∂α
∂c
= −1 (10)
It is straightforward to check that
∂p02
∂α > 0. Since α increases and p
0′
2 ∈ (0,1), we have
v˜ > v˜FR. Furthermore, ∂v˜∂c > 1 must hold, so that both p1 and p
0
2 are higher than in the
full-recognition equilibrium.
Now, because v˜FR < v˜(c), the firm is able to set p02 = p02(c) and p12 = p12(c) under
c¯. Furthermore, the firm’s profit would be higher than under c since α(c¯) = 0 and
α(c) > 0. Thus, the firm’s profit is strictly higher under the full-recognition outcome
than the outcome under the equilibrium when c > c¯. Finally, since the full-recognition
15
equilibrium outcome is feasible at c, this is a contradiction. Therefore, α(c) = 0 for all
c ≥ c¯.
When c ∈ [0, c¯], the firm’s first-order condition in the first period is given by
1− F(v˜)− p?1 f(v˜)v˜′ + δv˜′(1−α)
(
1− F(v˜)− f(v˜)v˜ + f(v˜)p02(v˜)
) = 0
we can substitute in the equilibrium equalities p1 = v˜ − δc and p02 = v˜ − c to obtain
1− F(v˜)− (v˜ − δc)f(v˜)v˜′ + δv˜′(1−α)(1− F(v˜)− f(v˜)v˜ + f(v˜)(v˜ − c)) = 0 (11)
Substituting in 1/v˜ = 1− δ(1−α)+ δ(1−α)p0′2 and rearranging, we obtain
αδc = v˜ − 1− F(v˜)
f (v˜)
(1+ δ(1−α)p0′2 ) (12)
Clearly when α = 0, v˜ is independent of c and is equal to vFR. Thus, since α(c) = 0 for
all c ≥ c¯, v˜(c) = vFR for c ≥ c¯ holds as well.
To see that α(c) ∈ [0,1) for any c > 0, assume otherwise. Then, α(c) = 1 for some
c > 0. Thus, all consumers with valuations v ∈ [v˜(c),1] who purchase in the first period
choose to opt out. For this to hold, it must be that p12 − p02 > c. However, in the second
period, the firm possesses a profitable deviation: by setting p12 = p02 + c − , for some
small  > 0, the firm’s profit increases by at least (1 − F(v˜(c)))(c − ), which is strictly
positive as  → 0 since c > 0. Hence, α(c) = 1 cannot occur when c > 0.
One can obtain that for c ∈ [0, c¯], the present value of profit under partial recognition
is given by
Π(c) = (v˜(c)− δα(c)c)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δ(v˜(c)− c)(1− F(v˜(c)− c))
which may be above or below profits under full recognition, depending on the value of
c (see uniform example in Section 5). Note that the firm can always obtain the second
period profit in the no-recognition equilibrium by setting p02 = p12 = p?. Since v˜ > p?,
first period profit is lower than under no recognition, but second period profit is higher
because the firm is able to price discriminate. When c = 0, the firm obtains the no-
recognition equilibrium profit. When c > c¯, α(c) = 0, and the firm obtains the full-
recognition equilibrium profit. It turns out that the firm’s profit is always higher under
no-recognition, which we prove in the following result.
Proposition 5 (Firm profit) The firm’s profit is highest when c = 0.
Proof: First, we note that the firm’s profit in a pooling equilibrium under any c ∈ (0, c¯] is
no greater (but potentially less) than its profit when it collects the opting out fee, which
is given by
Π(c) = v˜(c)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δp02(1− F(p02))
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The above expression is uniquely maximized when v˜(c) = p02 = p?. However, v˜ > p?
for all c > 0. Thus, the firm’s profit is lower when c > 0 than under the no-recognition
equilibrium when c = 0.
An intuitive explanation for this result is that when c = 0, the firm is able to obtain
the full-commitment profit, since it is effectively able to commit to constant prices p?
in both periods. Essentially, this allows the firm to commit not to use information about
consumers (because the firm in fact does not have this information in equilibrium).
Equilibrium consumer surplus is given by∫ 1
v˜
vf(v)dv−(1−F(v˜))(v˜−δc)+δ(∫ 1
v˜−c
vf(v)dv+(F(v˜)−F(v˜−c))c−(1−F(v˜−c))v˜)
(13)
The first and second terms in (13) represent the surplus from period 1 transactions:
consumers with valuations v ∈ [v˜,1] purchase the good and pay a price v˜ − δc. The re-
maining terms represent the surplus from period 2 transactions. Specifically, consumers
with valuations v ∈ [v˜ − c,1] are repeat customers and end up paying v˜ (including the
cost of opting out). Consumers with valuations v ∈ [v˜−c, v˜] are first time shoppers and
they receive a price discount of c. Hence, as mentioned before, new customers effectively
receive an “introductory” offer in both periods.
Lemma 2 When δ is close to 1 and c > 0, p1(c¯) < p?.
Proof: Consider the marginal consumer with type v˜ who is just indifferent between
purchasing in both periods and only in the second period. For v˜ , we have v˜ − p1 =
δ(v˜ − p02). Recall that p02 targets consumers in [0, v˜], and is implicitly defined by the
equality
F(p02(v˜))+ f(p02(v˜))p02(v˜) = F(v˜)
Also recall that c¯ and v˜(c¯) satisfy
F(v˜ − c¯)+ f(v˜ − c¯)(v˜ − c¯) = F(v˜)
Since p? uniquely satisfies F(p?) + f(p?)p? = 1, if v˜(c¯) = 1, no consumer would
purchase in the first period, so that p02 = p?. If this is the case, the monopolist possesses
a profitable deviation by lowering p1, thus selling to some consumers in the first period,
while still being able to set p02 = p12 = p? and obtain the same second period profit as
before. Therefore, v˜(c¯) < 1, so that p02 < p?.
Let k > 0 such that p02 = p? − k. Then in equilibrium we have v˜ − p1 = δ(v˜ − p02) =
δ(v˜ − (p? + k)). Substituting v˜ = p1 + δc and rearranging, we obtain
p? − p1 = k− c(1− δ)
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Therefore, for sufficiently high δ (e.g., δ = 1), we have p1(c¯) < p?.
Proposition 6 (Consumer surplus) When δ is close to 1 and consumer valuations are dis-
tributed according to Fx(v) = vx for x ∈ [0,1], consumer surplus is higher under full-
recognition (c = c¯) than under no-recognition (c = 0).
Proof: The proof proceeds as follows. First, it is immediately apparent that consumers
with valuations v ∈ [p02, p?] are able to purchase in the second period under full-
recognition (c = c¯), whereas under no-recognition (c = 0) they do not purchase at all.
Hence, such consumers are better off under full-recognition. Additionally, consumers
with valuations v ∈ [0, p02(c¯)] do not purchase at all in both settings, and so they are
indifferent. Next, we prove that consumers who purchase the good in both periods under
full-recognition are better off than under no-recognition. Finally, we will show that con-
sumers with valuations v ∈ [p?, v˜(c¯)) (who purchase only in the second period under
c¯) are also better off under full-recognition.
In the proof of Proposition 3, we showed that v˜ > p?. Under c = 0, consumers with
valuations v ∈ [v˜(c¯),1] obtain a net utility of (1 + δ)(v − p?). Under c¯, their utility is
v −p1 + δ(v − v˜). The difference in utilities is given by p? −p1 − δ(v˜ −p?). Hence, for
these consumers to be at least as well off under c¯, we must have (1+δ)p?−p1−δv˜ ≥ 0.
Since v˜ = p1 + δc¯ holds in equilibrium, it suffices to show that
p1 + δv˜
1+ δ = p1 +
δ2
1+ δc¯ ≤ p
?
Suppose on the contrary that this condition is not satisfied, i.e. for some k > 0, p1 =
p?− δ21+δ c¯+k, so that v˜ = p?+ δ1+δ c¯+k. Recall that p02 targets consumers in [0, v˜], and
is implicitly defined by the equality
F(p02(v˜))+ f(p02(v˜))p02(v˜) = F(v˜)
Since F is continuous, there exists w < 1 such that p02 < wv˜ . In equilibrium, we have
p02 = v˜ − c. Since p1 = v˜ − δc, we have p1 = p02 + (1 − δ)c. Thus, p1 ≤ wv˜ + (1 − δ)c.
Substituting for p1 and v˜ , we obtain:
p? − δ
2
1+ δc¯ + k ≤ w(p
? + δ
1+ δc¯ + k)+ (1− δ)c
Rearranging, we obtain
p?(1−w)− (δ+w) δ
1+ δc¯ + (k(1−w)− (1− δ)c) ≤ 0 (14)
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When δ is close to 1, the right-most term k(1−w)−(1−δ)c is non-negative. Noting that
δ ≤ 1 and δ/(1+δ) is increasing in δ (and highest at 1/2 when δ = 1), in order to violate
Inequality (14) (and thus obtain a contradiction), it is sufficient to show that
2p? ≥ 1+w
1−w c¯ (15)
Consider the class of cumulative distribution functions Fx(v) = vx on [0,1], where
x ≤ 1. For such distributions, w = p?x = 1(1+x)1/x . Let c¯x denote the minimum opting
out cost where the full-recognition equilibrium is obtained for a given x and some fixed
δ. Note that p?x = 1(1+x)1/x . Using the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 3 and
substituting F(v) = v , one can obtain c¯1 = (2 + δ)(8 + 2δ)−1, which is highest when
δ = 1 at 0.3. Thus, c¯1 ≤ 0.3. Recall the first-order condition in the full-recognition game,
i.e. when c = c¯:
1− F(v˜)− p?1 f(v˜)v˜′ + δv˜′(1− F(v˜)− f(v˜)v˜ + f(v˜)p02(v˜)) = 0 (16)
where v˜′ = 1
1−δ+δp0′2
. Substituting for Fx in the equality that defines p02 ,
Fx(p02(v˜))+ fx(p02(v˜))p02(v˜) = Fx(v˜)
we obtain p02 = v˜(1+x)1/x , so that p0
′
2 = p? < 1. Thus, v˜′ = 11−δ(1−p?) > 1. Furthermore,
v˜′ increases as x decreases. Substituting p02 = v˜ − c¯ in (16) and rearranging, we obtain
1− Fx(v˜)
fx(v˜)
− v˜′x(p1 + δc¯x − δ
1− Fx(v˜)
fx(v˜)
) = 0 (17)
Suppose for a moment that c¯x is fixed. The term on the left hand-side in (17) is positive
and decreases as x decreases, while the bracketed term on the right hand-side is positive
(since v˜′ > 0) and increases as x decreases. Since v˜′ also increases as x decreases, p1
(and subsequently, v˜) would have to be lower. Since v˜ = p1 + δc¯ holds in equilibrium
and v˜′ > 1, c¯x must decrease as well. Therefore, as x decreases, c¯x decreases, so that
for all x < 1, c¯x ≤ c¯1 ≤ 0.3.
Combining the above observations, in order for Inequality (15) to hold for all x ≤ 1,
it is sufficient to have
p?x
1− p?x
1+ p?x > 0.15 (18)
Simple algebra can be used to check that the left hand-side of Inequality (18) is smallest
when x = 1 and p?1 = 0.5, at which point Inequality (18) is satisfied. Thus, Inequality
(14) is violated, which implies that consumers with valuations v ∈ [v˜(c¯),1] are indeed
better off under full-recognition than under no-recognition.
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From the above analysis, we have p? ≤ v˜(c¯) ≤ p? + δ1+δ c¯ and p1 ≤ p? − δ
2
1+δ c¯.
It remains to show that consumers with valuations v ∈ [p?, v˜(c¯)) are also better off
under full-recognition than under no-recognition. Under no-recognition, a consumer
with valuation v ∈ [p?, v˜(c¯)) purchases in both periods, and their present discounted
utilities is given by v − p? + δ(v − p?). Under full-recognition, such a consumer is
able to purchase in the first period and by Lemma 2 obtain a non-negative utility of
v − p1 ≥ v − p? + δ
2
1+δ c¯. Since δ(v − p?) ≤ δ(v˜ − p?) ≤ δ
2
1+δ c¯, it follows that all
consumers with valuations v ∈ [p?, v˜(c¯)] are also better off under full-recognition,
which completes the proof.
In Section 5, we provide sharper comparative static results using a specific distribu-
tion. In particular, we show that when valuations are distributed uniformly and δ > 0, p1,
p02 , and α decrease in c for c ∈ [0, c¯), while v˜ and p12 increase. Additionally, consumer
surplus is increasing in c, while firm profit and social surplus are non-monotonic.
4.3 Purification Refinement
In this subsection, we present an equilibrium refinement based on taking the limit of
a sequence of games where all consumers’ costs of opting out are perturbed. More
formally, let G denote the original game. Let di, i ∈ N, denote a sequence of continuous
distributions over the cost of opting out (which is conditionally independent from F ),
such that limi→∞ di is the degenerate distribution on c. Let Gdi denote the perturbed
game where consumers realize their cost of opting out after they make their first period
purchasing decisions.
Definition 1 (Refined Equilibrium) An equilibrium of the original game is a refined equi-
librium if it is the limit of a sequence of equilibria of conditionally independent (continu-
ously) cost-perturbed games.
The following proposition shows that the pooling equilibrium is the limit of Gdi as
i→∞. Moreover, it is the only equilibrium that satisfies this refinement.
Proposition 7 (Refinement) The pooling equilibrium is the unique refined equilibrium.
Proof: Since consumers realize their cost of opting out after they make their first period
purchasing decisions, we need only focus on the monopolist’s price setting problem
and consumer’s purchasing decisions in the second period. Let v˜ denote the marginal
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consumer who is just indifferent between purchasing in the first period and possibly in
the second period, and purchasing only in the second period. First, we point out that
p02 ≤ p12 . To see this, note that p02 targets consumers with valuations in [0,1], while p12
targets consumers in [vˆ,1], where vˆ ≥ v˜ . Since Gdi is conditionally independent from
F(v), the proportion of consumers in [vˆ,1] who do not opt out is independent of their
valuation. Combined, these observations imply that p02 ≤ p12 . Consequently, a consumer
whose realized opting out cost is less than p12 − p02 would prefer to opt out. In setting
period 2 prices, the firm’s problem is the following:
max
p02 ,p
1
2
(F(v˜)− F(p02))p02 + (1− F(v˜))(p12 − di(p12 − p02)(p12 − p02))
Here, di(p12 − p02) is the proportion of consumers with valuations v ∈ [v˜,1] who pay
the "discounted price" p02 in the second period. Hence, out of consumers with valuations
v ∈ [v˜,1], a proportion of di(p1?2 − p0?2 ) will opt out. Suppose di is distributed over
[cL, cH]. Note that if p1?2 − p0?2 > cH , all consumers will opt out (which is suboptimal in
the second period if cH > 0, because the firm can capture (some of) the opting out cost
paid by some consumers by slightly increasing p12). On the other hand, if p
1?
2 −p0?2 < cL,
since p12 ≥ v˜ , we have p02 + cL > v˜ . Hence, no consumer would opt out. Subect to
p02 + cL > v˜ , the firm’s second period problem becomes
max
p02 ,p
1
2
(F(v˜)− F(p02))p02 + (1− F(v˜))p12
The firm’s optimal pricing strategy in this case is the same as in the full recognition
equilibrium in the original game when c ≥ c¯. Hence, when cL ≥ c¯, the equilibria of the
original game and of the perturbed game are strategically equivalent, whereby p12 −p02 =
c¯.
It remains to consider the equilibrium of the perturbed game when cL < c¯. When cL <
c¯, p02 + cL > v˜ can no longer be part of an equilibrium, or we would have a contradiction
with c = cL and α = di(p1?2 − p0?2 ) in the original game by Proposition 2. Hence, under
di, p1?2 − p0?2 ∈ [cL, cH]. Therefore, as i → ∞, p1?2 − p0?2 = c. Additionally, under di→∞,
the opting out decision of a consumer who purchases the good in both periods behave
independently of their valuation.
The pooling equilibrium of the original game satisfies p12 − p02 = c. Additionally, it is
the only equilibrium where all consumer types who purchase the good in both periods
have the same opting out strategy. Hence, it is the only refined equilibrium.
Combining Proposition 7 with the result in Proposition 2, we obtain the following
corollary.
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Corollary 1 (Costless Privacy) If c = 0, then every refined PBE outcome involves p1 =
p02 = p12 = v˜ = p? and α(v) = 1 ∀ v ∈ [p?,1].
Proof: By Proposition 7, the pooling equilibrium is the unique refined equilibrium. Tak-
ing c → 0 in the pooling equilibrium yields p1 = p02 = v˜ = p?. From Proposition 2, any
p12 ≥ p? can be a part of a PBE when c = 0. However, a slight perturbation in cost yields
p12 = p?. Hence, p12 must equal p? in a refined equilibrium. The result follows.
4.4 Myopic Consumers
So far, we have not emphasized the fact that v˜ , α, and c¯ are functions of the parameter
δ. For example, when δ = 0, all consumers with valuations v ∈ [p1,1] purchase in the
first period. Consequently, when δ = 0, the firm is able to obtain its no-recognition (full-
commitment) profit by setting p1 = p?. Mathematically, the first-order condition (12)
shows that v˜ = p? when δ = 0, and p1 = v˜ − δc = p?. Importantly, if δ = 0, we have
from p12 − p02 = c that
c¯δ=0 = p? −
F(p?)− F(p? − c)
f(p? − c)
When valuations are distributed uniformly and δ = 0, we have α = 1−4c for c ∈ [0,1/4].
Effectively, consumers “wake up” in the second period and realize that although they
made a purchase in the first period, they can still opt out to try and get a better deal.
However, if the firm were not myopic, it may choose to set p1 > p? in order to be able to
better price discriminate against consumers with high valuations in the second period.
We will now consider this case. Let δF denote the discount factor of the firm and δA
that of agents. Note that v˜ is defined by
v˜ = p1 − δAp
0
2 +αδAc
1− δA(1−α)
It is evident that as δA → 0, v˜ approaches p1. The firm’s first-order condition with
respect to p1 is now given by
1− F(v˜)− p?1 f(v˜)v˜′ + δF v˜′(1−α)
(
1− F(v˜)− f(v˜)v˜ + f(v˜)p02(v˜)
) = 0
where v˜′ = 1/(1 − δA(1 − α)(1 − p0′2 )). When δA = 0, we have v˜ = p1 and v˜′ = 1. The
firm’s first-order condition becomes
1− F(p1)− p1f(p1)+ δF(1−α)
(
1− F(p1)− f(p1)p1 + f(p1)p02
) = 0 (19)
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When p1 = p? and δF > 0, the left-hand side of (19) is positive since 1 − F(p?) −
p?f(p?) = 0. Thus, if δF > 0, p1 > p?. The intuition is that the firm takes advantage
of consumers being myopic and purchasing in the first period in order to further price
discriminate against them in the second period. Although the firm initially loses some
profit as a result of raising p1 above p?, it more than makes up for it in the second
period.
We further note that under the circumstances of δF being relatively large in compar-
ison to δA, the firm’s profit can surpass the no-recognition equilibrium profit. This is
straightforward to see when δA = 0: the no-recognition equilibrium profit is feasible by
setting p1 = p02 = p12 = p? (as a result of v˜ = p1). However, given δF > 0, the firm
prefers to set p1 > p?.
4.5 A More General Cost Function
So far, we have assumed that the cost of opting out, c, is expended in the second period.
More generally, the cost of opting out can be described by C = c1 + δc2, where c1 is the
part of the cost expended in the first period (e.g. using a virtual credit card when making
a purchase, or acquiring a gift certificate from a brick and mortar store), and c2 is the
part of the cost expended in the second period (e.g. calling a service in order to opt out
or to cancel a service before purchasing again). The assumption underlying this cost
function is that both costs c1 and c2 must be expended in order to successfully opt out.
For example, if a consumer used a credit card as opposed to a gift certificate to make a
purchase in the first period, but did call to cancel a service before purchasing again, this
consumer would still be recognized.
Fortunately, all of the previous analysis goes through by setting c = c1/δ+c2. Hence,
if c1/δ + c2 ≥ c¯, the full recognition equilibrium results. It is straightforward to see
that if there is a cost associated with opting out in the first period (i.e., c1 > 0) and
δ is sufficiently close to 0 (e.g., δ ∈ (0, c1]), then no consumer opts out and the full-
recognition equilibrium results. (If c1 > 0 and δ = 0, then no consumer opts out, but
all consumers with valuations v ∈ [p1,1] purchase in the first period, and so the no-
recognition equilibrium results.)
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5 Uniformly Distributed Valuations
In order to better illustrate the partial-recognition pooling equilibrium, we use this sec-
tion to provide its full characterization when valuations are uniformly distributed. We
are also able to provide sharper comparative static results.
First, we note that the no-recognition equilibrium results when c = 0, where the firm
sets prices p = p? = 1/2. The full-recognition equilibrium results when c ≥ c¯ (so that
α = 0). From the definition of α, we have that α = 0 implies
v˜(c¯)− c¯ = F(v˜(c¯))− F(v˜(c¯)− c¯)
f (v˜(c¯)− c¯)
Thus, with uniformly distributed valuations we have v˜(c¯) = 2c¯. The solution to the
firm’s second period problem is given by
p02 =
1
2
(v˜ +α(1− v˜)) (20)
and
p12 = v˜ (21)
To determine the marginal consumer type v˜ that purchases in the first period, we equate
the expected utility from purchasing the good in the first period to the utility from
waiting to purchase until the second period:
v˜ − p1 +αδ(v˜ − p02 − c)+ (1−α)δ(v˜ − p12) = δ(v˜ − p02)
Substituting the second-period prices and rearranging yields
p1 = 1
2
(δα(1−α)+ v˜(2− δ+ δα2))− δαc (22)
The firm’s first-period problem is to choose the marginal type v˜ and the prices p1, p02
and p12 to solve
max
v˜,p1,p02 ,p
1
2
(1− F(v˜))(p1 + (1−α)p12 +αp02)+ (F(v˜)− F(p02))p02 (23)
subject to (20), (21), and (22). Eliminating the prices by substituting the constraints into
the objective, differentiating with respect to v˜ , and rearranging the resulting first-order
condition yields
v˜ = 2+ δ((1−α)
2 + 2αc)
4+ δ(1−α)2 (24)
Finally, for a consumer to be willing to randomize about opting out, he must be indiffer-
ent about doing so; i.e., the benefit from remaining anonymous must equal the cost
p12 − p02 = c
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Substituting for the prices from (20) and (21) and rearranging yields
α = v˜ − 2c
1− v˜ (25)
The pooling PBE outcome is found by solving (24) and (25). In particular, let
φ(c) =
√
1+ δc(2− δ(4− 9c))
Then
α = 1
δ
(1+ δ(1− 3c)−φ(c)) (26)
and
v˜ = 1
4(1+ δ)(3+ δ(2+ 3c)−φ(c)) (27)
Additionally, we have p1 = v˜ − δc, p02 = v˜ − c, and p12 = v˜ . It is worth noting that the
expression for α is not well-defined when δ = 0. However, by taking the limit as δ goes
to 0, one can obtain limδ→0α(c, δ) = 1 − 4c. Finally, by setting α = 0, one can obtain
c¯ = (2+ δ)(8+ 2δ)−1.
The following proposition provides comparative statics results.
Proposition 8 (Uniform valuations) When valuations are distributed uniformly, the pool-
ing equilibrium satisfies the following properties:
• ∂v˜/∂c ∈ (0, δ) for c ∈ [0, c¯).
• p1, p02 , and α are non-increasing in c, and strictly decreasing for c ∈ [0, c¯).
• Consumer surplus is strictly increasing for c ∈ [0, c¯), so that it is highest at c¯. More-
over, all consumers experience a non-negative increase in utility as c increases.
Proof: The derivative of v˜ with respect to c is given by
∂v˜
∂c
= δ(3+ (2−9c)δ−1√1+cδ(2−(4−9c)δ)
4(1+ δ)
)
(28)
It can be verified that ∂v˜/∂c is maximized when c = 0, at which point it is equal to
7δ
8(1+ δ) ≤ δ
Since p1 = v˜−δc in equilibrium, it follows that as c increases, p1 decreases. In the proof
of Proposition 4, we showed that the following equality holds in equilibrium:
∂v˜
∂c
(p0
′
2 − 1)+
∂p02
∂α
∂α
∂c
= −1 (29)
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We have
∂p02
∂α = (1 − v˜)/2 > 0, ∂v˜∂c > 0, and p0
′
2 = (1 − α)/2 < 1. Hence, it follows from
(29) that ∂α∂c < 0. Thus, as c increases, fewer and fewer consumers opt out. Now, since
p02 = v˜ − c in equilibrium, it follows from ∂v˜∂c < δ that p02 decreases as c decreases.
We will now prove the final results regarding consumer surplus. First, note that
consumers who purchase in both periods always pay p12 = p02 + c = v˜ in the second
period, independent of whether or not they opt out. Consider a small (marginal) increase
in c, denoted by ∆c . As shown by (28), the highest increase in v˜ as a result of an increase
in c is bounded above by δ(1+δ)−1∆c . Since p1 = v˜−δc, as c increases, p1 decreases by
at least
(
δ−δ(1+δ)−1)∆c = δ2(1+δ)−1∆c . A consumer with valuation v who purchases
in both periods before and after the increase in c has utility v −p1+δ(v − v˜) before the
increase. After the increase, the consumer’s utility is at least v − (p1 −δ2(1+δ)−1∆c)+
δ(v − (v˜ + δ(1 + δ)−1∆c)). Hence, the consumer is no worse off after the increase
in c, but potentially better off. Now, we note that some consumers with valuations
v ∈ [v˜, v˜ + δ(1 + δ)−1∆c] used to purchase in both periods before the increase in c,
but after the increase in c they do not. However, these consumers, whether or not they
now purchase in both periods, are still better off, as the decrease in p1 more than offsets
the present-discounted increase in second period prices. Finally, since p02 is strictly
decreasing in c for c ∈ [0, c¯), increasingly more consumers find it beneficial to purchase
the good in the second period as c increases, and all consumers who only purchase in the
second period now pay a lower price. Hence, every consumer experiences a non-negative
gain in utility as c increases. Consequently, consumer surplus is highest at c¯.
The intuition for the results in Proposition 8 is the following. As c increases, the
wedge between v˜ and p1 increases, as more consumers prefer to wait to purchase in the
second period due to the higher cost of opting out. To mitigate the effect of losing first
period consumers, the firm responds by reducing the first period price. Now, although
the firm also benefits from the increase in v˜ , as it is better able to price discriminate
against high valuation consumers in the second period, the loss in profit due to losing
first period customers dominates the increase in profit due to better price targeting in
the second period. Hence, the firm responds by slightly decreasing p1 as c increases.
Additionally, although as c increases, more consumers prefer to wait until the second
period to purchase the good, a lot fewer consumers opt out, making it optimal for the
firm to reduce p02 .
The intuition behind the increase in consumer surplus is the following: when c = 0,
a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation arises among consumers. Specifically, it is in the best
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interest of every consumer to opt out, but doing so makes all of them worse off. As c in-
creases, fewer and fewer consumers opt out. Effectively, the cost of opting out mitigates
the coordination failure among consumers. When c is high, the firm and consumers an-
ticipate that very few consumers will opt out. This in turn forces the firm to lower p1 in
order to attract first period consumers, but allows it to reduce p02 , thus serving a larger
segment of the market in the second period.
Proposition 9 (Non-monotonicity) When valuations are uniformly distributed, the firm’s
profit is non-monotonic in the cost of opting out, c.
Proof: The present value of the firm’s profit is given by
Π(c) = (v˜(c)− δα(c)c)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δ(v˜(c)− c)(1− F(v˜(c)− c))
Substituting for v˜ and α, one can obtain
Π(c) = 1
8(1+ δ)
(
1+φ(c)+ δ(2(2+ δ)− c(6+ 2δ− c(8+ 5δ)−φ(c))))
Taking the derivative of Π(c) with respect to c, simple algebra shows that dΠ(c)/dc
evaluated at c¯ = 2+δ2(4+δ) is strictly positive for all δ > 0. Continuity of Π(c) in c implies
that when δ > 0, for c in a close neighborhood c¯, the firm’s profit is increasing in c.
By Proposition 5, the firm’s profit is maximized at c = 0. It follows that the firm’s
profit must decrease before it increases, directly implying that the firm’s profit is non-
monotonic in c.
In order to provide some intuition for the non-monotonicity result in Proposition 9,
we now consider the case where δ = 1. When δ = 1, we have φ(c) = √9c2 − 2c + 1,
α = 2 − 3c − φ(c), and v˜ = 18(5 + 3c − φ(c)). Figures 1(a)-(c) show how α, v˜ , and
p1 are affected by changes in c. We note that if c = 0, then this solution yields the
no-recognition outcome, in which half the consumers purchase the good in each period
(v˜ = p02 = 12 ) and they all opt to remain anonymous (α = 1). At the other extreme, if
c = 2+δ8+2δ = 310 , then the full-recognition outcome obtains in which 40% of the consumers
purchase in the first period (v˜ = 35 ), 70% purchase in the second period (p02 = 310 and
p12 = 35 ), and no consumer opts out (α = 0).
It is straightforward to use the above solutions to derive equilibrium profit and con-
sumer surplus as a function of the cost parameter c (Figures 2(a)-(c) present the case
when δ = 1). Equilibrium profit to the firm initially decreases in c and then increases.
Equilibrium consumer surplus is monotonically increasing in c. When c is deadweight
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(a) The probability of first-period con-
sumers opting out as a function of c
(b) First-period consumer cutoff type
as a function of c
(c) First-period price as a function of c
Figure 1: Comparative statics in the pooling equilibrium when c is deadweight loss
(a) Firm profit as a function of opting
out cost c
(b) Consumer surplus as a function of
opting out cost c
(c) Total surplus as a function of c
Figure 2: Comparative statics in the pooling equilibrium when c is deadweight loss
loss (e.g., the time and effort of setting up a new account), equilibrium social surplus
initially decreases and then increases, achieving a global maximum at c = 310 when no
consumers opt out. The intuition is as follows. When c = 0, all consumers who pur-
chase in the first period choose anonymity. As c begins to rise, consumers must pay a
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non-trivial resource cost in order to remain anonymous. Since in equilibrium, consumers
who purchased the good in the first period must be indifferent between anonymity and
identification, the cost of preserving privacy is passed on to the firm, resulting in lower
profits and lower social surplus. As c continues to rise, fewer consumers opt out and
deadweight loss eventually falls, causing profit to rise. Additionally, the decline in the
price charged to anonymous consumers in the second period, p02 , results in more sales
and even higher consumer surplus. When c is not deadweight loss (e.g., a fee charged by
a third party), equilibrium social surplus is monotonically increasing in c.
6 Regulation
In this section, we consider settings where the cost of opting out is revenue set and
collected either by a third party or by the firm itself.
6.1 In-House Privacy
We will begin by considering the case where the firm itself sets the cost of opting out.
The following proposition characterizes the firm’s behavior.
Proposition 10 (In-house privacy) If the firm is able to commit to the fee of opting out
before consumers’ purchasing decisions in the first period, it would set c = 0 and the
no-recognition outcome results. If the firm cannot commit, it would set c ≥ c¯, and the
full-recognition outcome results. This is independent of whether or not the firm collects
the fee of opting out.
Proof: First, we note that for a given c, the firm’s profit when it collects the fee of opting
out is no less than its profit when it does not. The firm’s profit when it collects the fee is
given by
v˜(c)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δp02(1− F(p02))
which is maximized when v˜ = p02 = p?, or when c = 0. Hence, if the firm could commit
to the fee of opting out before consumers’ first-period purchasing decisions, it would set
c = 0.
If the firm cannot commit to a certain opting out fee before consumers’ first-period
purchasing decisions, it would set c ≥ c¯. To see this, note that if the firm does not col-
lect the fee, it would never want consumers to opt out, and so it would set the fee pro-
hibitively high. Consumers would anticipate this when making their first period choices,
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and so the full-recognition equilibrium results. If the firm collects the fee, it would set
p12 −p02 ≤ c. To see this, note that if p12 −p02 > c, all identified consumers would opt out,
and the firm would reap a profit of p02+c from each of these consumers. However, if the
firm sets the opting out fee to be c′ > c such that p12 −p02 > c′ is still satisfied, identified
consumers would still strictly prefer to opt out, but the firms profit from each of them
would now be p02 + c′. Hence, p12 − p02 ≤ c holds. Additionally, p12 = max{p?, v˜} ≥ v˜
continues to hold. Thus, consumers anticipate that they cannot increase their utility in
the second period by opting out, and so consumers behave in the first period as in the
first period of the full-recognition game. Subsequently, the firm sets prices as in the
full-recognition game and sets c ≥ c¯. Hence, the full-recognition equilibrium outcome
results.
The result of Proposition 10 implies that when the firm can commit to setting the
opting out fee in the first period, it can effectively commit to prices. When valuations are
uniformly distributed, social surplus is monotonically increasing in the cost of opting
out, and is maximized when c = c¯. Therefore, with uniformly distributed valuations,
social surplus is maximized when the firm sets the opting out fee and does not have
commitment power.
6.2 Privacy Gatekeeper
Suppose there is a third party that acts as a privacy gatekeeper, operates at no variable
cost, and is able to commit to an opting out fee before first period purchases. The
gatekeeper can set an opting out fee for consumers, c, and it can negotiate a price with
the firm for setting c at a certain level (throughout, we maintain the assumption that
the gatekeeper holds all the bargaining power when negotiating with the firm). The
gatekeeper’s equilibrium actions in each case are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Privacy gatekeeper) When the privacy gatekeeper is only able to charge
consumers, it would set c = c? ∈ (0, c¯), where c? = arg maxc α(c)(1 − F(v˜(c)))c. When
the privacy gatekeeper is able to charge both consumers and firm, it would set c = 0 and
charge the firm Π(c = 0)−Π(c?).
Proof: When the gatekeeper does not negotiate with the firm, its optimal fee is given by
c? ∈ (0, c¯), such that
c? = arg max
c
δα(c)(1− F(v˜(c)))c
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We note that c? ∈ (0, c¯) holds because when c = 0 or c = c¯, the gatekeeper’s profit is
zero. However, when the gatekeeper is able to negotiate with the firm, the result is very
different. Recall that the present value of the firm’s profit is given by
Π(c) = (v˜(c)− δα(c)c)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δ(v˜(c)− c)(1− F(v˜(c)− c))
Thus, given any positive level of c, the firm would be willing to pay the gatekeeper the
following amount in order for the gatekeeper to set c = 0:
Π(c = 0)− (v˜(c)− δαc)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δp02(1− F(p02))
where Π(c = 0) = (1+ δ)p?(1− F(p?)). By Proposition 5, the firm’s profit is highest at
c = 0. Moreover, for all c > 0, we have
Π(c = 0) > v˜(c)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δp02(1− F(p02)) (30)
This holds because the right-hand side of (30) is uniquely maximized when v˜ = p02 = p?,
which only occurs at c = 0, while Π(c = 0) = (1 + δ)p?(1 − F(p?)). Now, since Π(c) =(
v˜(c)(1− F(v˜(c)))+ δp02(1− F(p02))
)− δα(1− F(v˜(c)))c, it follows that for all c > 0
Π(c = 0)−Π(c) > δα(1− F(v˜(c)))c
Therefore, the privacy gatekeeper is always better off charging the firm Π(c = 0)−Π(c?)
and setting c = 0 than setting any other c > 0 and extracting max{Π(c)−Π(c?),0} from
the firm.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When c > 0, the monopolist has to com-
pensate consumers who purchase in the first period by lowering the first period price.
In addition, the monopolist loses some first period customers (specifically, those whose
valuations are close to the first period price). Thus, the amount of money the monopo-
list is willing to pay the gatekeeper to set c = 0 is composed not only from its loss from
compensating consumers who opt out, but also from losing customers. Hence, the gate-
keeper is always better off setting c = 0 and charging the monopolist Π(c = 0)−Π(c?).
Example 3 With uniformly distributed valuations and δ = 1, social surplus is monotoni-
cally increasing in c when the cost of opting out is not deadweight loss (in the setting of
this example it is a fee collected by the gatekeeper). When the gatekeeper is only able to
charge consumers, it sets c? ≈ 1.5. The resulting profit for the firm is Π(c?) ≈ .45. The
privacy gatekeeper’s profit is ≈ 0.04. Interestingly, the firm’s profit in this case is lower
than its profit in the full-recognition equilibrium.
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When the gatekeeper is able to set prices to both firm and consumers, it sets c = 0,
and (when δ = 1) charges the firm approximately .05. Both consumers and firm are
worse off than in the full-recognition equilibrium, and social surplus is at its lowest level.
Furthermore, consumer surplus is lower than the situation where the privacy gatekeeper
is only able to charge consumers and sets c = c?.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides an explanation for why certain aspects of online consumer privacy
may be misjudged by policymakers. We present a game theoretic analysis of an envi-
ronment in which firms are able to recognize their previous customers, and may use
information about consumers’ purchase histories in order to price discriminate.
Specifically, we analyzed a model with a monopolist and a continuum of heteroge-
neous consumers, where consumers were able to circumvent being identified at some
cost. We showed that when consumers can costlessly opt out, they all individually choose
privacy, which paradoxically results in the highest profit for the monopolist. Under some
conditions on the distribution of valuations, we also showed that consumers are better
off overall when opting out is prohibitively costly. We considered a general equilibrium
framework, where a privacy gatekeeper (with commitment power) is able to act as a
privacy conduit. We proved that this privacy gatekeeper would only charge the firm in
equilibrium, making privacy costless to consumers. With uniformly distributed valua-
tions, we showed that firm profit and social surplus are non-monotonic in the cost of
opting out, and social surplus is highest when opting out is prohibitively costly. Over-
all, it appears that hard-to-understand disclosures and difficult-to-circumvent detection
(i.e. a high c) may actually work to the benefit of strategic consumers and, in some cases,
to the benefit of society overall.
There are several important directions in which the current work can be extended.
First, our comparative statics results can be extended to more general distributions over
consumer valuations. Additionally, competition among both firms should be considered.
Another interesting direction is to analyze a setting with multiple privacy gatekeepers
that are competing for contracts from firms and for business from consumers. An ad-
ditional important direction is to model the cost of opting out as private information to
each consumer, which is potentially correlated with their valuation (extending the equi-
librium refinement setting). Also, settings where consumers may obtain some benefit
from being identified, such as smaller search costs or better technical support should
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be considered (notably, even in such environments some consumers stand to lose from
being identified — for instance, consumers who shop relatively infrequently may receive
poorer technical support, etc). Settings where consumers may obtain some benefit from
being identified also beg for an opt-in policy to be considered. Yet another direction is to
consider firms collecting data other than consumers’ purchase histories and using it to
price discriminate (e.g., the amount of time taken from a consumer’s initial browsing of
a store’s webpage until purchase may be indicative of the consumer’s search cost, which
may affect their willingness to pay for future purchases).
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